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The problem of work injuries is a substantial one. Recent estimates 
put the cost of workers’ compensation benefits paid to injured Canadian 
workers and their families at more than $6 billion annually, or nearly 1 
percent of gross domestic product. In the United States, workers’ com-
pensation benefit payments amount to over $40 billion annually. And 
workers’ compensation benefit payments represent only a small portion 
of the economic costs of work injuries. Work injuries also entail losses 
due to lost production, damage to plant and equipment, and the uncom-
pensated losses suffered by injured workers that are estimated to be as 
much as four times the cost of benefits (Heinrich et al. 1980).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section 
discusses the economic theory of work injuries and illnesses. Specifi-
cally, this section examines employer and worker incentives for safety 
in the absence of government regulation. The chapter then discusses 
safety incentives created by different types of government regulation. 
Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORK INJURIES AND ILLNESSES
Work injuries are an unwelcome by-product of economic activity. 
In part, they are random events, but they are also, to some extent, under 
the control of workers and employers. Employers can reduce the num-
ber of workplace injuries and illnesses by investing in safer technology, 
providing workers with personal protective equipment (such as hard 
hats and safety glasses), training workers and their supervisors, etc.; 
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workers can avoid accidents by following safe work practices and by 
taking greater care on the job.
Both parties incur costs when an accident occurs. Workers’ costs 
include potential loss of income and medical expenses associated with 
treatment and rehabilitation as well as intangibles, such as pain and 
suffering and disability that reduces the ability to enjoy leisure activi-
ties. Employers’ costs include interruptions in production and damage 
to capital equipment and physical plant.
Since accident prevention also entails costs to employers and em-
ployees, public policy should encourage employers and employees to 
minimize the combined costs of accidents and accident prevention that 
are incurred by both workers and employers.1 It is possible to spend 
both too much and too little on accident prevention. Investment in ac-
cident prevention is socially efficient when total costs are minimized, 
that is, when an additional dollar spent on prevention reduces accident 
costs by exactly one dollar.
As indicated, both employers and workers affect workplace health 
and safety. We can expect that—if they are rational—both actors will 
make accident prevention decisions that are privately efficient. That is, 
we may expect that each will make decisions that minimize their own 
accident and accident costs individually; however, their decision mak-
ing process may not consider costs that are incurred by the other party.
However, under some conditions, it is at least arguable that em-
ployers do consider the workers’ accident costs when making invest-
ments in workplace health and safety and thus make socially efficient 
decisions as well. To understand this argument, let us consider a world 
where there are two types of employers, those with safe workplaces 
and those with hazardous ones. Assume that workers employed by safe 
firms do not risk having an accident or illness while at work—i.e., the 
probability of injury or illness is zero—while one of every ten workers 
employed by hazardous firms will have an occupational accident each 
year. Let us further assume that workers are aware of the probability of 
accidents at both types of firms and that they are free to choose the type 
of firm for whom they will work.
Under these assumptions, we may expect that if everything else 
were equal—i.e., the compensation package and other terms and con-
ditions of employment—all workers would prefer employment at the 
safe firms. In order to attract workers, hazardous firms will be forced 
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to increase wages above the level paid by safe firms. In other words, 
we would expect to find that hazardous firms pay a compensating dif-
ferential and that the magnitude of this differential will be related to 
the workers’ expected accident costs, including the cost of lost income, 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, etc.
So, for example, let us assume that the average cost of accidents 
for workers is $10,000 and that the average annual salary of workers in 
safe firms is $40,000.2 Since the probability of an accident at a hazard-
ous workplace is 0.1, then expected accident costs at that workplace are 
$1,000 (= 0.1 × $10,000). This means that hazardous employers must 
pay their employees an annual salary of $41,000 for employment at a 
hazardous firm to be equally attractive as employment at a safe firm.3 
Thus, the employer’s accident costs include the expected accident costs 
borne by workers. Importantly, employers will be able to reduce the 
compensating differential and, consequently, their accident costs, by re-
ducing the incidence of workplace accidents and illnesses.4
The economic model presented in the preceding paragraphs rests on 
a number of key assumptions, which many have questioned. In particu-
lar, the model requires that workers have complete and accurate infor-
mation with respect to the risk of injury or death and an absence of bar-
riers to worker mobility, i.e., that workers are free to move in and out of 
the labor market or between employers at relatively low cost. However, 
critics point out that it is likely that either workers do not have access 
to good information about injury risks or barriers to mobility prevent 
workers from moving to safer jobs. As a result, wage differentials due 
to the risk of injury either do not arise or they are inadequate, i.e., they 
do not fully compensate workers for the risk of injury. 
Do employers, in fact, pay a compensating differential to workers 
exposed to greater risks of injury or illness? To answer this question the 
researcher must address a number of methodological issues that are not 
easy or simple to resolve, and existing statistical evidence is decidedly 
mixed. By and large, research investigating the relationship between 
the risk of fatal injury and wages has found a risk premium, while stud-
ies examining the relationship between wages and non-fatal risks have 
not (see Viscusi 1993, for a recent review of this literature). However, 
Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) demonstrate that even fatal-risk differen-
tials are extremely sensitive to the regression specification.
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Importantly, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the risk differ-
ential is fully compensating, even for fatal injuries. In addition, research 
suggests that, after controlling for the risk of injury and a variety of oth-
er factors affecting wages, the wage differential is substantially larger 
for unionized workers than for nonunion workers (Olson 1981; Dickens 
1984; Fairris 1992; Siebert and Wei 1994; and Sandy and Elliott 1996). 
This result, which indicates that union workers get a greater premium 
for the same level of risk, is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis 
that wage differentials compensate workers for the expected cost of ac-
cidents.5 Finally, psychological research suggests that people overes-
timate the likelihood of a low probability event and underestimate the 
likelihood of a high probability event (Viscusi 1993). This systematic 
bias implies that workers will generally demand a risk premium that is 
less than fully compensating.
Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation provides cash benefits to workers who are 
unable to work as the result of an occupational injury or illness as well 
as medical benefits and rehabilitative services to all who are injured as 
the result of a workplace accident.
These benefits have the effect of reducing accident costs for workers 
and, consequently, the risk premium paid by hazardous employers. As 
a result, we may expect that the worker’s incentive for avoiding work-
place injuries will have been reduced because their accident costs have 
been reduced by the medical and cash benefits provided by the workers’ 
compensation program, a problem known as risk-bearing moral hazard 
in the insurance literature. We might also expect that workers’ com-
pensation benefits would increase the workers’ willingness to expose 
themselves to greater risks on the job, but that these benefits would also 
increase the likelihood that workers would report an injury that would 
have otherwise gone unreported or even falsely report a nonwork-re-
lated injury as occupational. This latter problem is known as reporting 
moral hazard. In either event, because workers’ compensation reduces 
the cost of workplace accidents for workers, we would expect it would 
also reduce the compensating wage differential. In fact, there is some 
statistical evidence indicating that as compensation becomes more gen-
erous, the risk premium for hazardous work is reduced.
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Do workers’ compensation benefits affect employers’ incentives to 
prevent workplace accidents? The answer depends on the way in which 
compensation benefits are funded. If the employer is liable for workers’ 
compensation benefits paid to his or her firm’s injured workers, then the 
employers’ incentive structure will be unchanged by the introduction of 
workers’ compensation. However, if there is no relationship between 
employer costs and worker benefits, then the employer’s incentive to 
prevent accidents is reduced by workers’ compensation benefits.
In Canada and the United States, workers’ compensation benefits 
are funded through a payroll tax paid by employers. A two-step process 
determines tax (or assessment) rates in most provinces. In the first step, 
industrial classifications are used to group firms who share similar risks 
of workplace injury or illness, so that banks are grouped with other 
financial institutions, for example, food stores are grouped with similar 
retail establishments, etc. The recent historical accident record of each 
of these classifications, known as rate groups, is used to determine the 
base assessment rate for each group. The assessment rate is set so as to 
provide sufficient income to fund all workers’ compensation benefits 
paid to workers and any expenses associated with workers’ compensa-
tion program administration.
In the second step of the rate-making process, known as experience 
rating, the base assessment rate for some firms is adjusted to account for 
the firm’s individual safety record.6 In other words, the assessment rate 
for firms with better than average safety records (lower injury rates) is 
reduced, and the rates of firms with worse than average safety records 
(higher injury rates) are increased.
Both steps of the rate-making process should reduce the injury rate 
relative to a regime where all employers are charged an identical assess-
ment rate unrelated to the risk of injury. Variation in the base assess-
ment rate means firms in hazardous industries pay a higher base assess-
ment rate than firms in relatively safe ones, so that the cost of goods and 
services produced by firms in hazardous industries increases relative 
to a regime in which a flat assessment rate is charged to all employers. 
In turn, this reduces consumption of goods and services in hazardous 
industries relative to safe ones and subsequently employment; as the 
proportion of employment in safe industries rises, the overall accident 
rate will drop.
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However, the base assessment rate is only marginally related to 
the firm’s accident experience. If the firm is not experience-rated, the 
employer does not consider workers’ compensation assessments to be 
part of the cost of accidents, since it cannot affect costs by preventing 
accidents. However, if the firm is experience-rated, then a reduction in 
the accident rate directly reduces its subsequent accident costs. Thus, 
if the firm is experience-rated, the employers’ investment in workplace 
safety will remain unchanged following the introduction of workers’ 
compensation insurance; however, if the firm is not experience-rated, 
the employer’s safety investment will decline after workers’ compensa-
tion is introduced.
Thus, workers’ compensation unambiguously reduces workers’ 
safety incentives and increases workers’ incentives to report compensa-
ble claims. Furthermore, since not all employers are experience-rated, 
the overall impact of workers’ compensation is to also reduce, on aver-
age, health and safety investments by employers.
Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Injuries: The Evidence
Since the introduction of workers’ compensation pre-dates the col-
lection of injury rate data, there are only a handful of studies that have 
attempted to directly examine this issue and those that do have pro-
duced contradictory results. Chelius (1976) found that the introduction 
of workers’ compensation programs led to a reduction in fatal accident 
rates relative to the tort regime that preceded them. However, Fishback 
(1987) reached the opposite conclusion, using a different (and arguably 
better) data set.
On the other hand, several studies have attempted to determine 
whether there is a relationship between the generosity of workers’ com-
pensation benefits and the work injury rate. As indicated, economic 
theory suggests that, where workers’ compensation insurance is less 
than perfectly experience-rated, the accident rate should be positively 
related to workers’ compensation benefit generosity.
A large number of studies using different methodologies and data 
sources have found the expected positive relationship between benefit 
levels and injury (or workers’ compensation claim) rates. Studies of 
the U.S. workers’ compensation include Butler and Worrall (1983) and 
Chelius (1982) who examined state-level claims and injury data and 
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Hirsch et al. (1997) who used longitudinal survey data to estimate the 
impact of benefit generosity on the probability that a worker would file 
a workers’ compensation claim. Canadian studies include Thomason 
and Hyatt (1997), who examined provincial injury rates and Thomason 
and Pozzebon (1995), who used data on individual workers to estimate 
claim probability. Uniformly, these studies have found that higher lev-
els of workers’ compensation benefits are associated with higher injury 
or claims rates or a higher probability that a worker would initiate a 
compensation claim.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND WORKPLACE SAFETY
There are at least three approaches to the regulation of occupational 
health and safety, all of which have been adopted by policy makers in 
one form or another at one time or another. The first—and the one most 
commonly identified as occupational health and safety regulation—in-
volves the promulgation of rules prescribing or proscribing specific 
policies and practices by employers, which are enforced through on-
site inspections and monetary penalties for infractions. The second ap-
proach comprehends systems of general safety incentives that reward 
or punish employers on the basis of safety and health outcomes rather 
than behaviors that are thought to affect those outcomes. This second 
approach is embodied in the experience rating of workers’ compensa-
tion assessments, whereby employers’ compensation costs are tied to 
their accident experience. The third approach, termed internal respon-
sibility, pervasive in Canada, is designed to improve safety and health 
conditions through workers’ empowerment and involves three principal 
elements: 1) the worker’s right to refuse to perform unsafe work; 2) the 
worker’s right to information on the nature of workplace hazards; and 
3) joint labor-management safety and health committees, which are giv-
en a mandate to oversee safety and health conditions in the workplace.
The Economics of Regulation
Occupational safety and health regulation seeks to change behav-
ior of the employer by changing the cost-benefit calculus described in 
the previous section, through imposition of monetary penalties or other 
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sanctions.7 Specifically, regulatory sanctions lower accident preven-
tion costs by the expected value of the sanction.8 In other words, firms 
considering adoption of a particular safety practice must now weigh 
expected costs of the sanction that will be imposed if they fail to do so. 
Sanction costs are characterized as “expected” because, under some—if 
not all—regulatory regimes, penalties are not imposed unless a viola-
tion is detected.
There are two costs that must be considered by efficient regula-
tors: the administrative costs of regulation (the cost of staff involved 
in enforcement and adjudication), and the cost of regulatory effort (the 
imposition of sanctions whose expected costs are either too great or too 
small). Sanctions are too small (large) if the costs of accident preven-
tion, including the expected savings from the avoidance of sanctions, 
are less (greater) than associated accident costs. The cost of error is 
equal to the difference between accident costs and the cost of accident 
prevention if the regulation in question is adopted and enforced. The 
goal of efficient regulation is to minimize the sum of these costs.
Direct Regulation of Workplace Hazards
As indicated, direct regulation attempts to change employer be-
havior by promulgating regulations that prescribe or prohibit specific 
employer or worker practices. Regulations are enforced through work-
place inspections and penalties for noncompliance. Critics argue that 
direct regulation fails to recognize important variation across firms with 
respect to technology and other characteristics. In other words, a safety 
practice that is efficient for one employer may not be efficient for an-
other, so that there are potentially substantial error costs. In addition, a 
system of direct regulation in which the regulator agency responsible 
for promulgating rules is one-step removed from the workplace and is, 
therefore, slow to respond to technological change. Once again, this 
could result in substantial error costs.
Furthermore, as Dorman (1996, p. 197) notes, “Most occupational 
risks are transitory . . . Safety features mandated by law may be unavail-
able or malfunctioning from time to time, but inspectors are not likely 
to know this.” In other words, the probability of detecting noncompli-
ance is low so that the regulators must substantially increase the mag-
nitude of the sanction imposed. Finally, direct regulation is costly to 
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administer. It requires an extensive bureaucracy to develop standards, 
inspect workplaces, and to resolve disputes with employers concerning 
the appropriateness of penalties.
Most research examining direct regulation is confined to an exami-
nation of the effects of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) of 1970. At best, this research has produced mixed results with 
respect to OSHA’s effectiveness, although more recent research—and, 
in some ways, methodologically superior—tends to find results that 
support the hypothesis that direct regulation reduces injury rates. (This 
question is also taken up by Mendeloff [1979, Chapter 11], with some 
comparative discussion on the United States and Canada.)
Much of this early research involved a time-series analysis or cross-
sectional pre- and post-OSHA comparisons of aggregate injury rate data. 
By and large, these studies were unable to find the expected reduction in 
the incidence of workplace injuries (Smith 1973; Mendeloff 1979; Cur-
rington 1986). However, Smith (1992, p. 566) notes data problems ren-
der such comparisons problematic: “Because the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act fully covers the private sector, and because before-and-
after comparisons are generally infeasible, a convincing study of the 
overall effects of the Act has not been—and may never be—done.”
Another group of studies has evaluated the impact of OSHA en-
forcement activity—that is, the effect of inspections and fines—on the 
incidence and severity of workplace injuries. Following Smith (1992), 
these studies may be classified into two categories: those using aggre-
gate industry injury rate data and those using plant level data.
Enforcement variables used in research examining industry aggre-
gate accident rates include lagged measures of the probability of inspec-
tion and the expected penalty for an OSHA violation. In general, these 
studies found little or no effect for OSHA enforcement activity. For 
example, Viscusi (1979) was unable to detect a statistically significant 
relationship between injury rates and either inspection probability or 
the expected penalty. In a later study, Viscusi (1986) found that OSHA 
enforcement reduced the lost workday incidence rate by a modest 1.5 
to 3.6 percent, although Smith (1992) argues that this result may have 
been a statistical artifact—the product of changes in employer reporting 
behavior resulting from a change in OSHA inspection strategies.
Arguing that these lagged penalty data were as much a measure of 
employer noncompliance as a proxy for a deterrent effect, Bartel and 
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Thomas (1985) estimated a system of structural equations in which the 
probability of inspection and penalties per inspection were treated as 
endogenous. They found that while OSHA significantly reduced em-
ployer noncompliance, there was little relationship between noncompli-
ance and the lost-time injury rate. However, these authors conclude that 
OSHA indirectly reduced accident rates by placing a greater regulatory 
burden—in the form of increased inspection probability—on firms with 
higher injury rates.
A study of industry aggregate injury rates in Quebec by Lanoie 
(1992) found a statistically significant negative relationship between 
inspection probability and the lost-time injury rate. However, the likeli-
hood of a workplace health and safety inspection by an officer of the 
Quebec government was positively associated with injury severity, 
measured as average number of workdays lost per injury. In addition, 
Lanoie failed to detect a statistically significant relationship between 
probability of penalty and either frequency or severity of work inju-
ries.
Research using plant level data have generally reached more opti-
mistic conclusions about OSHA’s effectiveness, although these studies 
have also produced mixed results. Two types of studies have been con-
ducted. Earlier research compared firms that had been inspected early in 
the year with firms that had been inspected late in the year, hypothesiz-
ing that inspection effects should be more evident for the former group 
of firms than for the latter group (Smith 1979; McCaffrey 1983). Using 
data from 1973 and 1974, Smith found that 1973 inspections reduced 
injury rates by about 16 percent while 1974 inspections induced a 5 
percent reduction, although the latter relationship was not statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels. McCaffrey failed to find a 
statistically significant effect using data from 1976–77. As Scholz and 
Gray (1990, p. 299) note, taken together, these results suggest that “the 
easily accomplished reductions in risk that OSHA inspections could im-
pose may have already been implemented in 1976, leaving more com-
plex issues of risk reduction, less amenable to quick fixes.”
As Smith (1992, p. 569) points out, because these early studies 
lacked data on citations and fines resulting from inspections, they were 
only able to measure the abatement of injuries following an inspection; 
as a result, these studies were unable to measure OSHA’s “deterrent” ef-
fect. Replicating this research, Ruser and Smith (1991) used a measure 
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of inspection probability based on the average inspection frequency for 
similar firms to estimate the deterrent effect. On the basis of this analy-
sis, they concluded that: “there is virtually no evidence of a deterrence 
effect” (p. 231).
Interestingly, recent plant-level studies, which use explicit before-
and-after comparisons of the same firms, provide evidence for a more 
sanguine assessment of direct regulation, Using a unique data set that 
allowed tracking of inspections and penalties for a large sample of in-
dividual firms over a seven year period, Scholz and Gray (1990) esti-
mated both the deterrence and abatement effects of OSHA enforcement 
activity. They found that a 10 percent increase in enforcement resulted 
in a 1 percent reduction in the accident rate, a much larger effect than 
detected in prior research, although one that the authors describe as 
“modest” (p. 302). This reduction was primarily due to a “deterrence” 
effect and, specifically, an increase in the probability of inspection, as 
opposed to an increase in the average penalty.9
Importantly, Scholz and Gray argue that their results indicate that 
economic models of occupational safety and health regulation, which 
assume that firms optimize when making safety and health choices, fail 
to account for the limited information processing capacity of manag-
ers.10 Due to their limited capacity, managers do not optimize, but often 
engage in “fire-fighting,” responding to problems as they become more 
significant relative to other issues. As evidence, Scholz and Gray find 
that an unexpected increase in the accident rate in one year will lead to 
a reduction in injuries in the next, and vice versa. In addition, they find 
a lag between OSHA enforcement activity and a change in firm health 
and safety—a result that they claim is evidence of an organizational 
learning curve. Ruser (1985) obtained similar results.
Nonetheless, overall the extant evidence suggests that OSHA has, at 
best, resulted in a modest improvement in workplace health and safety 
in the U.S. However, advocates of direct regulation argue that these 
disappointing results are primarily due to diffident administration and 
a lack of funding than to a fundamental flaw in this type of regulatory 
regime. In particular, they point to two problems. First, the process of 
adopting permanent health and safety standards under OSHA is slow 
and cumbersome. Governed by the Federal Administrative Procedures 
Act, the law requires a Notice of Intended Rulemaking and a subsequent 
proposal, both of which must be published in the Federal Register. This 
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is followed by a Public Hearing and comment period where all inter-
ested parties are invited to submit comments, which the agency must 
consider before promulgating a standard.11 After they are issued, stan-
dards are subject to judicial review, and the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the agency must provide substantial evidence that the standard is 
based on a “significant” risk. Second, agencies responsible for admin-
istering the Act are substantially underfunded, a problem exacerbated 
during the Reagan-Bush administrations. Dorman (1996, p. 193) notes 
that there are more fish and game wardens in the U.S. than occupational 
safety and health inspectors.
Critics have expressed greater apprehension over the impact of di-
rect regulation on economic productivity (Burton and Chelius 1997). 
There is a public perception, shared by some economists, that the pro-
liferation of industrial regulation in the 1960s, particularly with respect 
to occupational health and safety and environmental protection was 
responsible for anemic productivity growth since that time. Research 
is sparse, however. One study, estimating annual total factor productiv-
ity for 450 U.S. industries between 1958 and 1978, found that OSHA 
accounted for around 19 percent of the productivity slowdown of the 
1970s (Gray 1987). Viscusi (1996) has estimated the cost and benefits 
of five OSHA regulations and found that for four of these, the costs of 
the regulation exceed the benefits in terms of lives saved. However, 
Stone (1997) challenged Viscusi’s estimates, claiming he ignored other 
benefits, such as the reduction in injuries and illnesses. His reanalysis 
of one of these regulations showed it was in fact efficient, when these 
other benefits were considered.
Nonetheless, if one assumes that the direct regulation of workplace 
safety is inefficient public policy, then it is possible that direct regula-
tion could actually result in the deterioration of worker health. Keeney 
(1994) has argued that a reduction in disposable income due to these 
regulatory costs can lead to changes in spending on safety and health-
care more generally, greater stress due to job loss, and risky behavior 
such as increased alcohol and tobacco consumption.
Internal Responsibility System
A principal criticism of direct regulation is that it fails to recognize 
firm heterogeneity, so that standards appropriate for one firm are likely 
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to be inappropriate for another. In contrast, the internal responsibility 
system is highly adaptable to the particular circumstances of the firm 
and is flexible so that it can respond relatively quickly to technological 
change. The design of safety “standards” is in the hands of the parties 
themselves—labor and management—who are intimately familiar with 
plant operation and who are therefore well placed to implement regula-
tory standards that are effective and efficient. In addition, administra-
tive costs, which are principally borne by employers, at least initially, 
are relatively low. Enforcement is in the hands of the firm’s workforce 
so that the probability of detecting a violation will be high.
On the other hand, the success of the internal responsibility system 
is critically dependent on employee bargaining power. It is likely that 
internal responsibility is less effective in nonunion workplaces than in 
union ones. In addition, unions are political organizations that neces-
sarily respond to the preferences of their memberships. And safety and 
health are often given a relatively low priority by a rank and file that 
sometimes appears to be more interested in wages and job security. Fur-
thermore, the internal responsibility system can be used by employees 
to shirk legitimate work assignments or by labor unions as leverage in 
collective negotiations with employers. Finally, there are concerns that 
labor members may lack the expertise, particularly in the realm of oc-
cupational health, to either design effective standards or monitor firm 
compliance.
Unlike either direct regulation or general financial incentives, there 
is little direct evidence on the efficacy of the internal responsibility sys-
tem. Most of this research has examined joint health and safety com-
mittees (JHSCs) and much of it uses data on Canadian workplaces.12 
By and large, however, the Canadian studies either examine process 
issues or factors determining the relative effectiveness of JHSCs rather 
than the question of whether or not they reduce injury rates or otherwise 
improve worker health compared to workplaces without such commit-
tees. In addition, these studies often rely on subjective reports by the 
participants rather than objective evidence. Nevertheless, some useful 
information relevant to the question of the effectiveness of the internal 
responsibility system may be gleaned from this research.
For example, Shannon et al. (1992) find that lower accident rates 
are found in firms where the JHSC includes a senior manager; where la-
bor members had access to professional expertise; and where the JHSC 
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had a broad mandate rather than a narrow one. Furthermore, Tuohy 
and Simard (1993) find that JHSCs were more effective in reducing 
accident rates when the committee had an equal number of labor and 
management members and where there are well-established operating 
procedures. In other words, both studies indicate that JHSCs are more 
effective when employers give them greater resources and support.
Three studies directly examine the issue of whether JHSCs ame-
liorate workplace safety. Cooke and Gautschi (1981) combined OSHA 
administrative data with the results of a survey of 113 manufacturing 
firms in Maine to investigate, among other things, whether joint labor-
management safety programs affected firm injury rates. They obtained 
mixed results, which depended on firm size. Large firms with joint safe-
ty programs had lower injury rates than large firms that did not have a 
joint program. However, this result was statistically significant only for 
firms with more than 300 employees and only at the 0.10 confidence 
level. For small firms, the opposite result was found; firms with joint 
programs had higher injury rates. Boden et al. (1984) surveyed 290 
large (more than 500 employees) Massachusetts firms but failed to find 
a relationship between the presence of a joint safety committee and 
workplace injury or illness rates. Importantly, both of these studies—
Cooke and Gautschi (1981) and Boden et al. (1984)—use cross-sec-
tional, rather than longitudinal data, and are, therefore, limited in their 
ability to address the question of whether there is a causal relationship 
between JHSCs and workplace safety.
On the other hand, the most careful examination of internal respon-
sibility found that the internal responsibility system generally and JH-
SCs in particular were associated with lower levels of workplace inju-
ries and illness (Lewchuk et al. 1996). This study used administrative 
data from the Ontario Workers’ Compensation Board supplemented 
with data from two surveys. The authors find that both enactment of 
internal responsibility legislation and the introduction of JHSCs were 
negatively and significantly related to the workplace injury rate. Spe-
cifically, they find that JHSCs may reduce lost-time claims by as much 
as 18 percent relative to similarly situated firms without JHSCs. Impor-
tantly, they also find that joint committees were more effective at reduc-
ing injury rates in unionized firms than in nonunion firms.
The latter results suggest that unions play an important role deter-
mining the effectiveness of JHSCs. Similarly, Weil (1991, 1992) has 
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argued that unions improve the effectiveness of direct regulation. Us-
ing 1985 OSHA data from the United States, he has shown that unions 
increase inspection probability; inspection intensity, as measured by the 
duration of inspections per employee; and the scope of the inspection, 
i.e., whether or not the inspection resulted in a physical examination 
of the workplace. Weil also found that unions increased the number of 
citations as well as the severity of the penalties. These results suggest 
that there may be a synergy between direct regulation and internal re-
sponsibility, at least for unionized workplaces.
On the other hand, critics cite anecdotal evidence that shows that 
unions use regulatory agencies and, in particular, occupational safety 
and health agencies to enhance their power in organizing campaigns 
and in collective bargaining (Northrup 1997). JHSCs would seem to 
offer similar opportunities for unions to enhance their organizing and 
collective bargaining outcomes. However, Schurman et al. (1998) note 
that complaint-based inspections in unionized firms result in a higher 
percentage of violations than similar inspections in nonunion firms and 
argue that this contradicts an interpretation that unions use safety regu-
lation to gain organizing and bargaining advantage.
Hebdon and Hyatt (1998) present conflicting evidence with respect 
to this issue. They use Ontario data to examine factors influencing the 
probability of a refusal to do unsafe work or the probability of a health 
and safety complaint. In general, they found that while the probability 
of both events was higher where there is a contentious industrial rela-
tions environment, they found no evidence of concerted harassment of 
employers during collective negotiations.
More generally, we might expect that unionization could lead to 
more optimal health and safety conditions. Workplace health and safety 
has characteristics of a public good in that consumption is neither rival 
nor excludable.13 In addition, free rider problems may prevent unorga-
nized workers from negotiating the optimal provision of safety condi-
tions by the employer. That is, workers will be individually reluctant 
to reveal preferences because they fear that they will pay the full cost 
of safety. Employers must therefore rely on information gleaned from 
the labor market. However, such information necessarily reflects the 
preferences of workers who are very different than the average worker; 
these marginal workers are younger and are less likely to have family 
responsibilities. Among other things, marginal workers are likely to be 
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less concerned about workplace hazards and should be less willing to 
trade off wages for increased safety.
On the other hand, unions, which are democratic political organiza-
tions, are more likely to reflect the preferences of the average workers. 
In fact there is some evidence that unions in fact respond to the safety 
objectives of more senior workers while management is more likely 
to be influenced by the preferences of marginal workers (Kahn 1987; 
1990).
General Financial Incentives
Both direct regulation and internal responsibility attempt to regulate 
the safety process, imposing sanctions on employer behaviors thought 
to affect the accident rate. In contrast, a regime using general finan-
cial incentives regulates safety outcomes, imposing sanctions based on 
employer performance with respect to results-based workplace safety 
measures. One proposal for general financial incentives is the injury 
tax, whereby the government imposes a monetary penalty for each 
work-related injury or illness (Smith 1974). A more prosaic form of 
general financial incentives is experience-rated workers’ compensa-
tion insurance, as discussed in the previous section, whereby the firm’s 
compensation assessment is based, wholly or partially on its accident 
experience.
Like the internal responsibility system, a system of general financial 
incentives imposes no specific requirement vis-à-vis firm health and 
safety practices, allowing firms to select the most appropriate means 
for attaining its safety goals. Furthermore, under a system of general 
financial incentives, administrative costs will be lower than those in-
curred under either direct regulation or the internal responsibility sys-
tem. However, because experience-rating adjustments to workers’ com-
pensation assessments are based on the firm’s claim experience rather 
than its accident experience, experience rating provides employers with 
incentives to engage in claims management as well as accident preven-
tion. Claims management includes a number of less than desirable prac-
tices, including retaliation against workers who initiate compensation 
claims and legal challenges to legitimate claims by injured workers. In 
addition, for actuarial reasons, true experience rating is not feasible for 
small firms.
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There is substantial research investigating the impact of experience 
rating on the frequency and severity of work accidents. In general, these 
studies have found considerable evidence that experience rating is as-
sociated with lower injury rates, although there are a few exceptions 
(Hyatt and Thomason 1998). However, research that fails to find the ex-
pected effect is, in general, methodologically weaker than studies that 
do (Hyatt and Thomason 1998). Studies investigating injury severity 
have generally produced mixed results. There are two possible explana-
tions for the disappointing results with respect to injury severity: either 
employers have less ability to affect severity than the incidence of in-
juries or the effects of experience rating on incidence overwhelm the 
severity effect. That is, on the margin, experience rating induces em-
ployers to reduce the frequency of less severe injuries. In either event, 
severity studies are generally less informative and will not be reviewed 
here. However, a brief review of injury rate research follows.
Research examining the impact of experience rating on workplace 
safety, most of which uses U.S. data, falls into one of three categories. 
The earliest studies exploited the fact that U.S. experience-rating for-
mulae are different for large and small firms, so that large firms are 
more likely to be experience rated and are more extensively experi-
ence rated than small firms. Since a difference in injury rates between 
large and small firms could be ascribed to firm size effects unrelated 
to experience rating—such as, scale economies in accident prevention 
efforts—these studies examined the relationship between benefit gener-
osity and accident rate. As indicated previously, empirical research con-
clusively demonstrated work injuries are positively related to benefit 
levels. However, if experience-rating induces firms to improve work-
place safety, then this relationship should be attenuated in large firms 
relative to small ones. That is, as benefit levels become more generous, 
experience rated firms will increase their safety investment, partially 
offsetting the increased level of injuries resulting from worker moral 
hazard. Several studies found this hypothesized relationship (Ruser 
1985; Butler and Worrall 1988; Ruser 1991); only one failed to do so 
(Chelius and Smith 1983).
As indicated, the positive relationship between benefit levels and 
the work injury rate is primarily attributable to a reporting effect; work-
ers are more likely to report an injury when benefit levels are high than 
when they are low. It is unlikely that fatal claims are subject to this 
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reporting phenomenon, so that the relationship between benefit levels 
and fatal injury probability should more accurately reflect the impact of 
benefits on employer behavior. Four studies have examined this rela-
tionship, and three found that the incidence of fatal injuries was nega-
tively associated with higher benefit levels, as expected if experience 
rating has safety-enhancing effects (Moore and Viscusi 1989; Ruser 
1991; and Durbin and Butler 1998). Only Butler (1983) failed to find 
the hypothesized negative relationship.
Several studies have taken advantages of “natural experiments” to 
compare injury rates before and after the implementation of an experi-
ence rating program. Chelius and Kavanaugh (1988) examined inju-
ry rates of two New Jersey colleges before and after they elected to 
self-insure and ceased to be covered by private compensation insur-
ance.14 Chelius and Smith (1993) compared occupational injury rates 
for small firms in Washington, which gives experience-rated discounts 
to these firms, with injury rates for small firms in states that do not 
offer these workers’ compensation claim rates in Ontario and British 
Columbia, respectively, before and after the introduction of experience 
rating in those provinces. Shields et al. (1997) explored the effect of 
the implementation of “large-deductible” compensation insurance poli-
cies—where insured firms are responsible for the first several thousand 
dollars of compensation costs—in Texas. Finally, Durbin and Butler 
(1998) used state-level U.S. data to investigate the effects of both large 
and small deductible policies as well as a rule change that lowered eligi-
bility criteria for experience rating.15 With the sole exception of Chelius 
and Smith (1993), these experiments found that experience rating was 
associated with lower injury rates.
Out of 14 studies reviewed here, 11 found evidence that experience 
rating results in an amelioration of workplace health and safety. This 
evidence was produced by research that is remarkably mixed with re-
spect to both data sources and methodology. And, as indicated, a careful 
examination reveals that studies failing to detect this relationship were 
methodologically weaker than those that did. Taken as a whole the evi-
dence is quite compelling: experience rating works.
However, as Hyatt and Thomason (1998) point out, the leap from 
the observation that experience rating is associated with lower injury or 
claims rates to the conclusion that experience rate enhances firm safety 
is short, but perilous. Experience rating may lead to increased claims 
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management by employers, who file claims, as well as pro-active staff-
ing practices designed to screen job applicants likely to file a workers’ 
compensation claim. This has the effect of reducing injury reporting, 
while leaving workplace hazards undisturbed. Two studies show expe-
rience rating increases employers claims management activity.
Examining a large set of administrative records from Ontario, Hyatt 
and Kralj (1995) found that experience-rated employers were signifi-
cantly more likely to appeal claims than non-experience rated employ-
ers, and that the likelihood of an appeal for experience-rated employers 
increased as a function of the financial incentives that they faced. Kralj 
(1994) analyzed a small survey of Ontario employers in which manag-
ers were asked to report their impressions of the effects of experience 
rating on their behavior, i.e., changes in accident prevention and claims 
management practices resulting from experience rating. He found that 
while both prevention and claims management behaviors increased, 
experience rating had a greater impact on accident prevention efforts. 
Thus, while it is clear that experience rating leads to more intensive 
claims management efforts, this is not the only effect. Furthermore, 
claims management is not an unalloyed evil. The denial of fraudulent 
claims is both equitable and efficient, and there is evidence indicating 
that a prompt return to work leads to more successful rehabilitation.
Using a survey data set consisting of over 450 Quebec manufactur-
ers, Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) examined the estimated relation-
ship between experience rating and a wide range of firm health and 
safety and claims management practices. These practices included, for 
example, the amount of health and safety training provided to workers, 
the extent to which the firm disputed workers’ compensation claims, 
the number of in-house personnel devoted to claims management or 
accident prevention activities, and firm expenditures on personal pro-
tective equipment. They found that experience-rated firms were both 
more likely to engage in more aggressive claims management and to 
make greater effort to increase workplace health and safety. Interest-
ingly, however, the evidence also suggested that high wage firms are 
more likely to reduce workers’ compensation claim costs by increasing 
their accident prevention efforts (relative to their claims management 
efforts) than low wage firms. This result implies that there may be a 
“high road” and a “low road” response to experience rating.
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CONCLUSIONS
The past 20 years have seen a substantial accumulation of knowl-
edge concerning the effects of various policy options, although much is 
left to be learned. It is by no means certain that policy makers have fully 
taken advantage of this knowledge or that they have developed a co-
herent policy with respect to occupational health and safety problems. 
Rather, policy has developed in a piecemeal fashion as jurisdictions 
have experimented with various approaches to these problems.
Until recently, these approaches tended to emphasize direct regu-
lation and, more recently, internal responsibility; general financial in-
centives are little used. Workers’ compensation programs have only 
recently introduced experience rating to the assessment process, and 
in most provinces in Canada, there are restrictions on its application, 
which substantially limit its effectiveness. For example, in British Co-
lumbia the experience rating adjustment is limited to 30 percent of the 
base assessment rate.
However, considerable evidence indicates that general financial in-
centives are effective in reducing accident rates. Moreover, experience-
rating does not share many of the problems associated with the other 
two approaches. In addition, both the costs of direct regulation and its 
apparent limited effectiveness call into question whether a broad appli-
cation of direct regulation is appropriate.
Nonetheless, general financial incentives, particularly in the form 
of experience-rated compensation assessments, are not a panacea. Two 
problems may be identified. First, because accidents are, by definition, 
random events, general financial incentives are not easily applied to 
small firms—the small firm’s experience is not necessarily indicative 
of its underlying safety. Second, due to the long latency of many oc-
cupational diseases, it is difficult to assign responsibility to a particular 
employer. Finally, direct financial incentives assume that firms engage 
in an optimizing cost-benefit calculus, but the evidence suggests that 
limited information processing capacity may lead managers to satisfice. 
Under these circumstances, direct regulation could provide a needed 
shock to focus managerial attention on safety and health problems.
While this implies a continued role for direct regulation, it also 
suggests a more limited and targeted approach. More specifically, due 
to the high costs of direct regulation, the resources required by this 
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option should be directed at high-risk industries. This would include, 
in particular those in which there are numerous small firms, such as 
construction and those in which there is a relatively high probability 
of catastrophe—that is, an accident in which there is significant loss of 
life—such as underground mining. In addition, these resources should 
also be directed to the problem of long latency occupational disease, 
where it is unlikely that general financial incentives will be effective. 
This includes funding research that would investigate the relationship 
between occupational exposures and subsequent disease development 
as well as funding for monitoring workplace exposure.
Key Messages
• Much has been learned in the last two decades regarding effec-
tive policies to reduce disabling injury at work.
• Both direct regulation and internal responsibility have been wide-
ly used in Canada, whereas general financial incentives recently 
have become more pervasive as they are in the United States.
• Financial incentives do appear effective in reaching injury rates 
whereas the limited effectiveness of direct regulation raises ques-
tions about its value except where it may be targeted at high-risk 
individuals and longer-latency occupational disease exposures.
• General financial incentives are limited in their value for small 
firms.
• A stronger role for workplace exposure surveillance is necessary. 
Notes
 This chapter reprinted by permission. See Thomason (2003).
 1.  Accident prevention costs are manifested in higher production costs and lost 
productivity, which means that there are fewer goods and services including, for 
example, medical and rehabilitation services for those claimants who are injured 
or become ill due to a workplace accident or exposure.
 2.  The $10,000 figure for accident costs subsumes an evaluation of the monetary 
value for intangibles such as pain and suffering.
 3.  This example assumes that workers are risk neutral, i.e., they are indifferent be-
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tween income that will be paid with certainty (such as the wage income available 
from safe employers, where there is no risk of injury) and income that is uncer-
tain (such as the wage income paid by hazardous employers, where there is a 10 
percent chance that the worker will lose wage income due to a work accident). If 
the worker is risk averse, as is generally thought to be the case, then the worker 
would demand a salary higher than $41,000 to compensate him or her for the 
additional risk incurred by working for a hazardous employer.
 4.  It is important to note that workers will continue to have an incentive to avoid 
workplace accidents and illnesses even if the wage is fully compensating, i.e., if 
it compensates workers for all of the expected cost of injury. This is because the 
worker will continue to incur costs if an accident occurs, unless he or she is able 
to purchase insurance that covers those costs.
 5.  Interestingly, one of the few studies that failed to find this relationship used a 
Canadian data set (Martinello and Meng 1992).
 6.  It is not feasible to experience rate small firms, i.e., firms with only a few em-
ployees. Because work accidents are random events and because their employ-
ment base is small, the number of accidents does not provide a reliable estimate 
of the underlying risk of injury.
 7.  It is also possible that Occupational Health and Safety regulations could attempt 
to influence the behavior of employees, although none of the existing regulatory 
models contemplates this.
 8.  Alternatively, sanctions raise the costs of not engaging in accident prevention.
 9.  Scholz and Gray also used their data set to replicate prior research in order to de-
termine reasons for the discrepancy between their results and the results of these 
earlier analyses. They concluded that Smith (1979) and McCaffrey (1983) failed 
to find significant abatement effects because they had not accounted for long-
term enforcement effects. Smaller deterrence effects found by Viscusi (1986) 
were attributed to sample differences. Specifically, the Scholz and Gray sample 
contained plants that were larger, more dangerous, and more heavily inspected 
than the average manufacturing plant examined by Viscusi. Scholz and Gray 
hypothesized that the plants in their sample were more amenable to the ameliora-
tive effects of OSHA enforcement than the average plant.
 10.  The phrase “limited information processing capacity” is not meant to apply only 
to the abilities (or limitations) of managers. Rather it refers to limitations that 
constrain us all (including university professors).
 11.  For example, Meisenhelter (1991) notes that a period of six years elapsed be-
tween OSHA’s initial work on a Hazards Communication standard — similar 
to WHMIS — before it was finally issued in November 1983. Over 200 written 
comments were submitted totaling over 12,000 pages. There were 19 days of 
hearings, which produced 4,250 pages of transcripts.
 12.  A literature search uncovered only two studies examining the effect of an aspect 
of internal responsibility other than JHSCs on workplace safety. Lanoie (1992) 
estimated the impact of refusals to do unsafe work in Quebec, using industry 
aggregate data. He failed to find a relationship between the number of refusals 
per employee and the lost-time injury rate. However, Lanoie’s data show that 
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refusals are negatively related to injury severity, although this relationship is 
only marginally significant in two of his four specifications and statistically not 
different to zero in the other two. On the other hand, Cousineau et al. (1995), who 
also used Quebec data, found that refusals were positively related to one type 
of injury (“struck by or striking against”) thought to be particularly susceptible 
to safety regulation, while negatively related to two other types (“caught in or 
between” and “falls or slips”). However, the latter two relationships were not 
statistically significant.
 13.  A rival good is one that may be consumed by one and only one person. If it is 
possible to prevent the consumption of a good, it is excludable. A candy bar is a 
good that is both rival and excludable, while, clean air is both nonrival and non-
excludable. These distinctions are important because it is generally thought that 
a private market is perfectly capable of efficiently providing rival and excludable 
goods, but not goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable.
 14.  Firms that self insure, an option available in most U.S. states for firms that meet 
certain fiscal requirements, are, by definition, perfectly experience-rated.
 15.  In most U.S. states, there is a minimum payroll requirement that a firm must 
satisfy in order to become experience rated.
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